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Abstract—Smart home user usually controls smart devices
through smart application, which is managed by user’s account.
Thus, compromised account is possible and countermeasure to
such attack can help protect both devices and data pertaining
to them. In this paper, we propose a security countermeasure
in case of compromised account in smart home system by intro-
ducing another layer of access control beyond the traditional
authentication method (e.g. username and password). In our
proposed approach, although user is successfully authenticated,
he subjects to another control at devices or data permission
level for every access attempt to them. This control takes into
account the profile and behaviour of user requesting access
to the system to determine whether user is legitimate or
malicious and access control permission and type of access
control enforcement are decided based on that factor.
Keywords-Account hacking; access control; smart home; IoT;
security countermeasure; compromised account;
I. INTRODUCTION
Among 8 categories of threats [5] in Internet of Things
(IoT), the attack such as account hacking is an obvious cause
for concern since IoT users generally use smart application
to manage and control devices or data. If user’s account is
compromised and once attacker get user’s credentials, he can
use to bypass security filters and steal information, alter data,
damage devices and deny service. Thus, in IoT environment
and smart home in particular, it is important to put more
control on devices and data even after user is authenticated.
Detecting the abnormal behaviour of user at authentication
level is not new and it has been addressed and implemented
in many well-known systems, such as Google Gmail or Face-
book 1. However, in such systems, once user is authenticated,
there is no further control on what user is accessing or
doing afterward. This security loophole allows malicious
user to gain access to data without any limitation once
he passes the authentication phase. Compromised account
in mailing system or social network may be less severe
compared with IoT services such as smart home. Hacking into
cameras installed in home, violating privacy, and accessing
content (pictures and movies) are some of the security
threats introduced by the new era of connected homes. These
violations of accessing the content of home automated devices
can lead to many dangerous outcomes, such as burglary or any
1https://www.facebook.com/help/loginapprovals
other form of troubles. Therefore, the issue of compromised
account and its countermeasure should be addressed carefully
since IoT promotes the openness and collaboration where
information is more exposed to attacks compared with closed
system [5].
In our security countermeasure approach, although user is
successfully authenticated, he still is subjected to a denial
access if the system detects that he is highly likely a malicious
user. The method to find out if user is a malicious or
legitimate is to analyse user’s present behaviour against his
past behaviour (user’s access pattern), hence, user’s access
history is used as a source for information mining. The
machine learning method such as association rule learning
[8] is used for analysing the user’s behaviour for user’s
frequential pattern. In this approach, devices and data are
controlled by access control policies where the behaviour of
user is expressed in these policies in the form of probabilistic
value (degree of certainty whether user is legitimate or
malicious). The access control model used in this paper is our
proposed extended version of Attribute-based Access Control
(ABAC) [7]. An access control architecture supporting our
security countermeasure and its implementation in XACML
[10] are also presented in this paper.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II talks about
the motivation and security issues in smart home scenarios.
Section III focuses on security countermeasures against
compromised account. The user’s profile and behaviour
analysis are also discussed in this section. Other important
point in this section is the mining of user’s access history
for frequential access pattern. The proposed access-log
structure for smart home system is also discussed in this
section. Section IV presents the access control model and
policies expression for some scenarios in smart home. Section
V focuses on access control system architecture and its
implementation in XACML. Section VI is the related work
and Section VII is our conclusion.
II. MOTIVATION AND SCENARIO
In the existing smart home services providers, users need to
have accounts at clouds services, then, through this account,
user can add smart devices and connect them to cloud services.
After that, user can access and control them. Since user’s
account is generally used for managing and accessing devices,
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the issue of compromised account can not be ruled out. We
provide account hacking scenario below and illustrate the
importance of security countermeasure against such issue in
smart home.
We take a smart home scenario where home owner (user)
routinely executes commands to smart devices using smart
home application. Each user has an account, which can be
used to access the smart devices. User can, for example,
turn-on or off devices (e.g. refrigerator, TV, ...), check the
video surveillance and other sensing devices. The interaction
between user and smart devices has been happening in the
more or less precise time interval, which creates an access
pattern. Suppose that there is a situation where account is
hacked and malicious user executes commands on devices
in the strange way (e.g. turn-off refrigerator or CCTV when
user is not at home ). User has never executed such command
in such situation (not at home). It is worth noting that
turn-off refrigerator or CCTV has bad consequences from
foods spoilage to security issue given CCTV used to surveil
home remotely is turn-off. In such situation, how system
intelligently react to such strange behaviour and prevent
malicious user from executing those commands?
Figure 1. smart home architecture with authentication and access control
supporting mechanism against compromised account
III. SECURITY COUNTERMEASURE AGAINST
COMPROMISED ACCOUNT
Unlike other systems [1], users, in smart home, tend to
repeat their daily activities in more or less precise time
interval. For example, every Monday to Friday at 6 PM, home
owner arrives, opens the door and turns on air-conditioner.
At 7 PM, he turns on TV and turns it off at 11 PM before
going to bed. Before going to work, at 7 AM, the CCTV
is turn on for surveilling the house during his absence. The
CCTV is always on when home owner is not at home.
All these activities (actions on devices) are more or less
repeated daily and they constitute the access patterns of
those devices. These access patterns can be used to prevent
any abnormal access performed out of the observed patterns.
For example, if an attacker successfully hacks the system,
gets into user’s account and commands to turn off the CCTV
at the time when home owner is not at home, this action
can be considered as suspicious because this pattern user has
never done before. Thus, more comprehensive and restrictive
access control needs to be enforced as the precaution measure.
In other words, access control to devices and data must be
strengthened.
A. Smart home architecture
Figure 1 is our proposed physical architecture of smart
home system where the authentication and access control
modules are integrated. In this architecture, we propose to
use the centralised approach [12] for access control in stead
of decentralised one [12] because analysing user’s access
log as well as validating access control policy requires big
memory and high computational power. Thus, decentralised
access control approach where policy validation and decision
needs to be done at device level is not suitable to be used in
our case given that most smart devices have limited power
and memory. In this architecture, Figure 1, there are two
main parts: the user authentication and access control. The
architecture consists of the following modules.
1) User is a physical person or application requesting
access to devices or data pertaining to them.
2) Authentication module is responsible for authenticating
user. User’s credential or other information such as
username or password are used for authenticating user.
3) IoT Gateway module is responsible for processing
data from smart devices and communicating it to IoT
platform. IoT gateway can handle different network
technologies deployed at home environment, such
as WiFi, Lora, Zigbee, 6LoWPAN or other wireless
communication technologies. IoT supporting platform
generally refers to IoT server, a module responsible
for processing or storing data from smart devices and
also providing services to end-user application. There
are two types of IoT server: public and private servers.
Public server refers to a server being publicly accessible
and used by many users. For example, a cloud service
or other type of similar service. For private server, it
is built for a particular smart home network and it
is accessible only for that network users. The private
server can be installed in or out side the home network.
4) Policy Decision Point (PDP) is an access control
module being responsible for filtering access requests
based on their defined authorisation policies. This
entity could be instantiated by or embedded into a
gateway with direct communication to the devices that
it manages, or another entity in a different location,
either in home network or in the cloud service (see
Figure 1).
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5) Legitimate/Malicious is a module responsible for
analysing and extracting user’s access pattern based
upon which the decision of whether user is legitimate or
malicious is performed. Once user type is determined,
the user’s information is passed to PDP.
6) Home network environment consists of a network of
interconnected smart devices used in home.
Figure 2. User’s access log format for smart home system
The step-by-step information flow is presented below.
Figure 1: step-by-step information flow explanation
(1) Authentication request, user provides the authentication
information, such as username, password or other user’s
credential for authentication purpose. (2) Once user is authen-
ticated, an authentication response is sent to user. If response
is positive, user can get into his account. (3) User can
use available services in smart application. Every time user
executes command, an access request is sent for validation. (4)
Access request is sent by user to PDP for validation. (5) PDP
sends a request to “Legitimate/Malicious” for user behaviour
analysis. (6) “Legitimate/Malicious” analyses user’s access
log for access pattern. (7) After analysing user’s access
log, “Legitimate/Malicious” module sends user’s behaviour
analysis response to PDP. (8) PDP validates user’s request
against defined access control policies. (9) Decision response
is sent by PDP to IoT gateway. (10) IoT gateway forwards
decision response to user.
B. User behaviour analysis
User behaviour analytics (UBA), as defined by Gartner
[8], is a cyber security process about detection of insider
threats and targeted attacks. UBA solutions look at patterns
of human behaviour, and then apply algorithms and statistical
analysis to detect meaningful anomalies from those patterns-
anomalies that indicate potential threats.
Since our main objective is to determine if user is
legitimate (actual) or malicious, we use UBA technique to
address this issue. We apply association rule learning [8] for
analysing the user’s access history to extract the user’s usage
pattern and use this pattern to detect attack.
1) Access log structure: The smart home access Log is a
type of log that contains all requests to resources (devices
and data pertaining to them) of a smart application. For
example a user requests to turn on or off smart door, CCTV
or thermostat, the smart application and smart home system
validates user’s request and the access log will record the
requests of user to devices. In our security countermeasure
approach against compromised account, user’s access log
plays as an important role because it is the source of
information for user’s access pattern extraction. Thus, we
define, in this section, a general access log structure for smart
home system taking into account different parameters, such
as spacial and temporal constraints, type of sensing devices
and other contextual information. This access log structure
(see Figure 2) will be used for user’s behaviour mining in
the following section. Our proposed access log format in
Figure 2 consists of the following parameters.
• “User’s identity” stores the identity of physical person
or application accessing resources (devices).
• “Actions on device” stores the operations on smart
devices or sensing devices.
• “Access decision” stores the information concerning the
decision by PDP on user’s request. The decision can be
“Deny” or “Permit”.
• “Device’s identity” stores the unique identity of device.
• “Device’s type” stores information concerning type of
devices. For example, sensing device or actuator.
• “Date information” stores information concerning the
date at which user accesses to smart home system.
This parameter is divided into two parts: the date
stores actual date (e.g. DD/MM/YYYY) and remark
stores information concerning date, such as working
day, weekend or holiday.
• “Time” records the time at which user accesses and
uses the system. It is divided into three parts:
– “Accessing time” stores time at which user accesses
system.
– “Start session” stores time at which the usage
session starts after access permission is granted.
– “Stop session” stores time at which the usage
session stops.
• “Identity of device used to access” records the unique
identity of device used to access system. For example,
user uses smart phone, tablet, desktop or laptop to get
access to system.
• “OS used” stores information concerning the operating
system (OS) used by the device to get access to system.
• “Location of access” stores information concerning the
location of user at the time of access. For example,
network identity, physical or geolocation of user.
• “Smart-app identity” stores the unique identification of
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smart application used to connect to smart home system.
• “Smart-app version” stores the information concerning
the version of smart application used to connect to smart
home system.
2) Mining of user’s access behaviour for frequent pattern:
in smart home context, there is always the relationship
between commands user executes on devices and time at
which they are executed. It relates to daily activities of home
owner. For example, home owner turns on TV at 7 PM or
smart door is open at 6 PM when he arrives home. These
habit, from time to time, constitutes an access pattern. Any
action that is different from user’s access pattern may be
questionable (e.g. account may be compromised) and more
control procedure and enforcement are required.
In our proposed approach, this access pattern is im-
portant for detecting the abnormality in user’s behaviour.
To determine the relationship between user, devices and
time at which he executes commands, we use, association
rule learning, a rule-based machine learning method for
discovering interesting relations between entities in smart
home context (see parameters in user’s access log format).
Association rule learning (ARL) is a rule-based machine
learning method for discovering interesting relations between
variables in large databases. It is intended to identify strong
rules [8] discovered in databases using some measures of
interestingness [8]. ARL is generally used to analyse the
relationship between products in large-scale transaction data
recorded by point-of-sale (POS) systems in supermarkets.
However, it is also used in other areas, which require to
determine the relationship between entities in the database.
Definition: let X and Y be two set of entities (or item
sets) where X ∩ Y=0. X ⇒ Y is an association of X and Y.
Let S be a set of transactions of a given database.
Confidence of rule (X ⇒ Y ) is an indication of how
often the rule has been found to be true.
The confidence value of a rule, X ⇒ Y , with respect to
a set of transactions S, is the proportion of the transactions
that contains X which also contains Y.
Confidence is defined as: Conf(X ⇒ Y ) = supp(X∪Y )supp(X)
Support (or supp) is an indication of how frequently
the itemset appears in the dataset. The support of X
with respect to S is defined as the proportion of trans-
actions “s” in the dataset which contains the itemset X.
supp(X) = |{s∈S;X⊆s}||S|
Apply ARL for user’s access pattern extraction. Suppose
we have two sets of entities X and Y. X contains (user, action,
device) and Y contains (time) (see Figure 3). We want to
find the relationship between user performs action on device
and time that action is executed. Since rule confidence is
an indication of how often the rule has been found to be
true, this means that, the high confidence indicates user’s
habit, hence, it can be considered as access pattern. Thus, any
access request falls out of this access pattern is considered
as suspicious and needs further scrutinise.
Example 1: Rule confidence calculation
Suppose that we have the transactions like in Figure 32.
User, Edward, through his account in smart home appli-
cation, executes command “turn-off” to device (CCTV)
at 6PM. With this request, analyse if the user is actually
“Edward”. Calculate the rule confidence of ((Edward, turn-
off, CCTV), 6PM) given his past access history in Fig-
ure 3. Conf((Edward, turn − off, CCTV ) ⇒ 6PM)=
supp((Edward,turn−off,CCTV )∪(6PM))
supp(Edward,turn−off,CCTV ) =
3
3 .
With the rule confidence equals “1”, the system
concludes that the user is high likely “Edward”.
There is one drawback for this approach that is we need to
have a reasonable size of access history in order to produce
a reasonable prediction. This approach can not be applied in
case of new user without access history.
It is worth noting that the user’s access pattern represented
by the rule confidence is one of the constraints in access con-
trol policy. This access constraint along with its enforcement
technique are expressed in access control policy and will be
evaluated at policy evaluation phase. We present the access
control model and how to express user’s access pattern in
that access control policy in next section.
Figure 3. Example: simplified version of user access history
IV. ACCESS CONTROL MODEL AND POLICIES EXPRESSION
The required user’s access pattern can be incorporated
with other existing access control models [7] [9]. However,
in this paper, we extend attribute-based access control to
support our proposed approach. The idea of extending this
model is that ABAC is well known access control model that
is being used widely in many systems [7]. ABAC is well
known for its ability to express fine-grained and complex
2This is a simplified version of access-log, derived from Figure 2. In this
example, accessing time is used as one of entities for extracting user’s access
pattern. It is worth noting that in practice, it is highly likely that user could
not operate, everyday, at exact point in time. For example, everyday at 6 PM
, turn-on the TV. It may differ in seconds or minutes. Thus, pre-processing
or mining of raw access-log is required before giving as inputs to ARL in
order to achieve correct estimation.
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policies and it is easy to understand and manage. The well
known existing access control engine such as XACML is
also implemented based on ABAC model. ABAC is good
to be used in large number of IoT access scenarios in the
domains, such as smart home, traffic control, agriculture and
transportation [2].
Figure 4. Extended ABAC
A. Extended attribute-based access control
ABAC [7] defines an access control model whereby access
rights are granted to users through the use of policies which
combine attributes together. ABAC is becoming well known
and considered as a “next generation” authorisation model
because it provides dynamic, fine-grained, context-aware and
intelligent access control. ABAC uses attributes as building
blocks in a structured language that defines access control
rules and describes access requests. Attributes are sets of
labels or properties that can be used to describe all the entities
that must be considered for authorisation purposes. As shown
in Figure 4, the traditional ABAC model consists of 4 main
entities (e.g. subject, action, resource and environment )
where each entity may hold multiple attributes.
• Subject attributes describe the user attempting the access
e.g. age, clearance, department, role, job title...
• Action attributes describe the action being attempted
e.g. read, delete, view, approve...
• Resource (or object) attributes describe the object
being accessed e.g. the object type (medical record,
bank account...), the department, the classification or
sensitivity, the location...
• Contextual (environment) attributes deal with time,
location or dynamic aspects of the access control
scenario. For more details about ABAC, see in [7].
To formally incorporate “user’s behaviour” into ABAC model,
we propose the extension like shown in Figure 4. The user’s
behaviour analysis entity is responsible for providing the
estimation value of whether user is considered as malicious
or legitimate. The new extended ABAC policy should contain
not only user, action, resource and environmental attributes,
but also the user’s behaviour attribute(s).
The user’s behaviour information is considered as separate
entity from environment attributes in ABAC model because
in traditional ABAC, environment attribute is any information
regarding the context of the access that might be used
in making the access decision, such as, time, network or
spacial context whereas user’s behaviour information is
the information from different sources used for estimating
whether user is a legitimate or malicious. In most cases,
information used for analysing user’s behaviour is a complex
data sets that generally come from databases (e.g. access
history) or external information system.
Extended ABAC policy expression
• Let U be a set of users (u);
• Let A be a set of actions (a);
• Let C be a set of resources (c);
• Let E be a set of environment attributes (e);
• Let B be a set of user’s behaviour analysis variables
(b). This variable expresses the level of certainty if user,
who is requesting an access, is legitimate or malicious.
“b” is expressed in probabilistic value;
• Let O be a set of obligations (o) that user or system
needs to perform if abnormal behaviour is detected.
The permission assignment in ABAC is expressed as (u,
p) where p is a permissions on resource. p=(a, c, e). The
behaviour-based ABAC policy expression is as follows.
p= ((a, c, e), (b , o))
Definition 1: ABAC environmental variable expression
Let E be a set of environmental attributes (e), where e ∈ E .
“e” has the finite domain of possible values, denoted as N
where n ∈ N . “e” is equipped with the relational operators
(Oprs) “ =, 6=,≥, and ≤ ”. The condition of “e” has the form
(e opr n). let e1 and e2 be two environmental variables. Then,
(e1 ∧ e2) or (e1 ∨ e2) are multiple environmental variables
conditioned in policy. For example, time ≥ 20:10:00.
Definition 2: User’s behaviour expression
Let B be a set of user’s behaviour (b), where b ∈ B. “b” has
the finite domain of possible values, denoted as D where d
∈ D, d = [0, 1]. “b” is equipped with the relational operators
(Oprs) “ =, 6=,≥, and ≤ ”. The user’s behaviour of b has
the form (r opr d).
let b1 and b2 are two behaviour variables. Then, (b1 ∧ b2)
or (b1 ∨ b2) are multiple behaviours conditioned in policy.
Definition 3: Obligation expression
Let O be a set of enforcement obligation variables (o), where
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o ∈ O . “o” has the finite domain of possible values, denoted
as B where b ∈ B. “o” is equipped with the relational
operators (Oprs) “ =, 6=,≥, and ≤ ”. The obligation of
“o” has the form (o opr b). For example, user notification
obligation has the form: notify = true.
B. Example: Strengthening Access Control in case of Com-
promised Account
In this section, we provide a complete smart home access
scenario, the policy expression for controlling access to smart
devices and show how countermeasure against compromised
account can be achieved. We take the smart home scenario in
Section II. Edward, who is the home owner, installed a smart
home system in his property. All devices, including smart
door, in his house can be controlled by smart application
through his account. Edward’s account is authenticated by
username and password. Edward uses a smart door, which
is controlled by the following access control policies.
(1) Policy1: rule states that user ”Edward” can open smart
door if the probability of certainty that user is “Edward” is
greater than or equal 90%.
(2) Policy 2: the second rule state that “Edward” can open
smart door if the probability of certainty that user is “Edward”
is less than 90% given that Edward can answer the question
he registered at the time of creating his smart home account.
A notification to Edward is also required.
Suppose that b is user’s behaviour analysis variable, hence,
we can express the two policies in ABAC as follows.
• Policy 1: (Edward, ((open, smart-door, b ≥ 0.9)))
• Policy 2: (Edward, (open, smart-door, b<0.9),
prove(question)=true ∧ notify(Edward)=true)
In this example, policy 1 allows to open the door without
any further control if the system analyses Edward’s access
log and finds that user, requesting to open the door, is highly
likely “Edward” with the probability of certainty greater than
or equal 0.9. For the second policy, if the probability is below
0.9, system requires user to prove himself by answering a
question and a notification is sent to Edward for validation.
The question and its answer are registered at the time Edward
created account. The second condition is an enforcement
operation performed by system to prevent attacker from
successfully executing commands. It is important to note that
the threshold “0.9”, in this example, can be determined based
on the observation of user’s access history for a reasonable
periods of time.
Suppose that an attacker successfully hacked to Edward’s
account and commands to open the door at 4 PM. Given
Edward’s access history in Figure 3 and two policies above,
what is the decision of the system? The request provided
to system by hacker is: (Edward, open, door, 4PM). System
analyses Edward’s access log and find that Conf ((Edward,
open, door) ⇒ 4PM) = 0 (see Section III.B). This means
that the policy 2 is applied and attacker needs to answer
the question. Since attacker does not know the answer to
the question that Edward registered at the time of creating
account, system rejects the request of attacker and notifies
Edward about the request although attacker successfully
hacked Edward’s account (account is compromised).
It is worth noting that other factor that can be used for
access control decision is the behaviour of user at the time
of request such as number of failed access attempts.
V. ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we present the implementation of extended
ABAC in XACML policy engine [10].
A. ABAC system architecture
The system, in Figure 5, consists of the following modules.
1) User is a Man Machine Interface acting as the inter-
mediate layer between system and physical person.
2) PEP handles request from user and forwards it to policy
decision point for further policy evaluation.
3) Recourses are the digital assets that are securely stored
in system storage or smart devices.
4) Obligation is a module handling different obligations
that user or system needs to fulfil (e.g. notification).
5) PDP is responsible for validating the access control
policy. It consists of three modules.
a) Environmental attribute validation (EAV) is re-
sponsible for retrieving the environmental infor-
mation from policy information point (PIP) or
external information system.
b) OSAV is responsible for validating the object’s
and subject’s attributes. These attributes are gen-
erally retrieved from PIP.
c) User validation is responsible for analysing user’s
request and his behaviour in order to determine
if user is legitimate or malicious.
6) “Enforcement against compromised account” is respon-
sible for enforcing some actions aiming to prevent
malicious user from accessing devices. This process is
complex and sometime requires a lengthy procedure
that user or system needs to follow. For example, if
system detects that user is suspicious, system may
require user to prove his identity either by answer
question (question and answer registered when creating
account) or use other credential to prove.
B. Implementation
In order to test our concept, we implement ABAC in
XACML. Some scenarios in smart home are used for
validation and testing. We also develop the behaviour analysis
engine in Java and integrated with XACML engine.
Testing data set. In order to test our proposed security
countermeasure approach, we need access history. We gener-
ate a simulated access history for 50000, 100000 and 1000000
transactions (records) stored in the access log file with the
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Figure 5. ABAC access control architecture supporting mechanism against
compromised account
data structure like in Figure 3.
Performance evaluation. The idea is to evaluate the general
performance of ABAC system with our security countermea-
sure approach. Since we use access history as the source of
information for access pattern extraction and user’s behaviour
analysis, larger access history can introduce larger delay
for access control policy evaluation. Thus, it is important
to observe the policy evaluation processing time given
different sizes of access history. We used 60 access control
policies expressed in XACML policy language for testing. We
simulated 50 different access requests and find the average
policy evaluation processing time. We tested our system in
Macbook air 1.3 Ghz Intel Core i5, memory 8 GB 1600
MHz DDR3. The result is shown in table I.
As expected, the policy evaluation processing time is
increased in accordance with the size of the access log
(see Table I). In case of load system, this issue can be
a big challenge. However, there are two possible ways for
reducing the policy evaluation time. The first option is to
minimise the size of the access-log; another is to increase the
computational power of the system (e.g. parallel computing).
To minimise the size of access-log, we need to minimise
the size of observation interval. One solution is to divide a
large observation internal into many smaller intervals (equal
size). Then, we define the threshold (required maximum
probability that user is legitimate) of each interval. The final
Table I
POLICY DECISION PROCESSING TIME
Experiment No Log size Average processing time
1 50000 records 156 milliseconds
2 100000 records 203 milliseconds
3 1000000 records 580 milliseconds
threshold value, which is used in policy, is an average of the
threshold values from the smaller intervals. With this method,
the size of access log used to calculate the value is the size
of access log of one interval (the most recent access-log),
not the entire access-log. For example, instead of using one
year access-log, we can use a month access-log to evaluate
the rule (policy).
We also tested the false negative (user requesting access is
the real user, but the system permits with condition because of
the absence of access pattern in the past) ratio to evaluate how
the system reacts to abnormal behaviour of user. We tested
in third experiment (see table I). The following information
are used to generate access-log.
User = Edward, David, Jean, Pascal, Marie.
Action = turn-on, turn-off.
Device = CCTV, refrigerator, door, light.
Time = 6PM , 7PM , 5PM , 4PM, 10AM,11AM, 9AM.
The combination of user, action, device and time is selected
randomly from above sets to form a record. In our experiment,
the access pattern ”David, turn-on, CCTV” is observed for
different time interval and the behaviour analysis variable is
set to 0.1443 (based on data set in access history). We created
4 different policies for David with 4 different behaviour
analysis thresholds (b): b ≥ 0.1443 (policy 1), b ≥ 0.3
(policy 2), b ≥ 0.5 (policy 3), b ≥ 0.8 (policy 4). We tested
100 different requests and we find that if the threshold is
set too high, most of requests are permitted with condition
(see Section IV.B). This shows that user’s access does
not concentrate at a particular time. Among 100 requests
(randomly pick) and when policy 1 is used, 8 requests return
false negative. It is worth noting that this test is small, we
need to test it with larger sample (number of users and access
log). We consider this task as one of our future work.
VI. RELATED WORK
Many efforts have been made in the research community
to address the security issues in smart home and IoT system.
Below are some researches relating to authorisation, access
control and solutions to threats in smart home system.
N. Komninos et al [13] focuses on issues related to the
security of the smart grid and the smart home, they present
an integral part of the smart grid. Based on several scenarios,
they present some of the most representative threats to the
smart home/smart grid environment. The threats detected
are categorised according to specific security goals set for
the smart home/smart grid environment, and their impact on
the overall system security is evaluated. However, this paper
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does not address and implemented a specific solution for any
threats. Authors presents a general threats from their defined
scenarios and their overall security impacts on system.
M. Schiefer [11] defines the definition of smart home and
categorises different products associated with smart home.
The author also provides incidents and analyses in smart
home context to estimate potential security threats in the
future. The security threats in smart home are well studied
by author, but there is not specific solutions to address them.
Rahul et al [2] proposed an access control model for home
automation devices, which offers the capabilities to identify
and connect physical devices into a unified secure system.
The authors proposed to use Access Control List (ACL) as
the access control security model to manage access to devices.
Although ACL is simple to both understand and implement,
it is not suitable for complex and fine-grained access control
policies, which are needed in many IoT scenarios.
Bruce et al [1] conducted a security analysis and improve-
ments of authentication and access control in the Internet
of Things. The authors proposed the improvement protocol
for authentication and access control by introducing the
cryptographic key in both authentication and access control
processes. RBAC is author’s primary study in the paper.
Authors also built their system to validate its performance
and the result indicates that the improved protocol possesses
many advantages against popular attack [5], and achieves
better efficiency at low communication cost.
Ricardo et al [4] proposed a model-based security toolkit
for IoT, which is integrated in a management framework
for IoT devices, and supports specification and efficient
evaluation of security policies to enable the protection of
user’s data. The authors’s work is applied to a smart city
scenario. The access control model, the authors used for
building the frame work, is the improved RBAC model where
the concept of trust and trust relationship is introduced.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose the security countermeasure in
case of compromised account and the general architecture of
smart home system. Although the experiment shows that our
solution provides promising result, there are many more work
that needs be done. Especially, we need to test our system
with larger sample and most importantly deploy this system
in real home environment so that the access history sample
can be collected and analysed. Our future work is to look at
the device management and the secure policy administration
toolkit for smart home.
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